This article explores the divisions created by the Great Patriotic War, its aftermath and the reconstruction of Russian cities in the late 1940s and early 1950s. It examines the conflicts created by rebuilding housing, infrastructure, restoring communities and allocating resources in cities where war's painful legacy continued to be felt. The war's impact varied enormously between cities on the frontlines and in the rear. Contrary to official propaganda rebuilding was a protracted process, which created divisions rather than unity.
This article seeks to challenge the myth of post-war social unity and argues against a collective experience of urban reconstruction across Soviet Russia by highlighting the remarkable diversity of war's impact on cities and the diversity of local responses to rebuilding. The history of Soviet post-war reconstruction has often been written from the perspective of the band of territory laid waste by war. Several accomplished histories of post-war reconstruction focus on heavily damaged cities in this zone. 10 The dramatic stories of cities like Stalingrad, Voronezh and Smolensk, which lost over three-quarters of their housing, and where inhabitants survived in dugouts amidst the ruins, naturally dominate the historical imagination. Yet, even within the warzone there was great variation in the extent of damage and the speed of reconstruction. The Great Patriotic War's impact on urban life, however, was felt far across Soviet Russia and could not be measured purely in terms of war damage. As Donald Filtzer and Mark B. Smith remind us, war placed cities far behind the frontlines under enormous strain. Cities earmarked as evacuation centres, particularly eastern industrial areas, experienced rapid wartime industrialisation and sudden population influxes, but without corresponding increases in housing or budgets. Chronic under-investment during and after the war, while the state directed its resources to waging war and repairing the worst damage, left these cities severely overcrowded unable to maintain dilapidated buildings or build sufficient new housing. 11 Although the war's impact was less immediate in these cities, it was nevertheless profound. 10 Hygiene, and Living Standards, 1943-1953 This article, therefore, seeks to disaggregate and disentangle the experience of severely wardamaged cities from neglected industrial cities in the rear. It seeks to move beyond the post-war plans for the redevelopment of Moscow and Leningrad, the most developed and intensively studied Soviet cities, to focus on regional citiesnot least because the two capitals experienced their own particular forms of urban development often at odds with wider trends. 12 It concentrates in particular on Stalingrad, the most iconic and badly damaged of Soviet frontline cities, as well as industrial cities used as evacuation centres, including Kuibyshev, Cheliabinsk and Magnitogorsk. Although the focus is on major cities, rather than the hinterland industrial regions examined by Filtzer, it shares his approach of exploring the disparities between cities, and the different physical, social, economic and political problems created by reconstruction. 13 Far from being rapidly reconstructed, as official propaganda frequently asserted, this article argues that the progress of Soviet urban reconstruction was more uneven and more protracted than aggregate reconstruction figures indicated. The post-war which the relationship between individuals and the state was negotiated, but it assumed an added resonance in the wake of wartime destruction. 15 As Rebecca Manley argues, 'housing emerges as a contested terrain in which individuals and groups fought not only over scare material resources, but over who won the war, and the extent to which the war would determine the postwar order.' 16 The article, therefore, draws upon a wide variety of source materials concerning Russian cities preserved in central Moscow archives, much of which is cited here for the first time. These sources include, amongst others, official statistics, city budgets, reports on the progress of reconstruction, requests from municipal authorities for additional finance, discussions amongst architects about the challenges of reconstruction and letters of complaint from individual citizens.
The Soviet Union, of course, was not alone in experiencing the extreme destructiveness of the Second World War. Hundreds of cities across Europe were partially or completed devastated by bombing and shelling. Warsaw and Dresden, for example, suffered damage comparable with the worst affected Soviet cities. While the challenges of reconstruction (shortages of finance, skilled labour and building materials) were often broadly similar, different societies responded in different ways with varying outcomes. Although widespread urban destruction was a disaster for residents, urban elites sometimes saw silver linings. Planners, architects and political authorities often viewed ruined cities, 'as an unprecedented opportunity to introduce radically modernising changes in the urban fabric on a scale that had been almost impossible in existing, built-up cities.' 17 For much of Europe reconstruction was about more than recovering from war damage, it implied a measure of social, economic and political reform and a vision for a better society. The completeness of Germany's economic, political, social and moral devastation, for example, combined with the shock of violence, mass death and urban destruction, compelled a wholesale restructuring of society. 18 In Britain, meanwhile, urban planning during and after the war offered the prospect of better, cleaner, healthier, more rational and comfortable urban spaces. New visions of the urban future in the form of public housing, New Towns and garden suburbs meshed well with political goals of post-war social 17 appearance would be so magnificent as to convince visitors and residents of the power and historically progressive nature of the Soviet project.' 32 Well before the war's end, plans for rebuilding war-torn cities began to take shape. The State Committee on Architectural Affairs, established in September 1943, commissioned leading national architects to draw reconstruction plans for war-damaged cities, and chief architects were appointed in dozens of cities to supervise the implementation of these plans. 33 Indeed as the historian Andrew Day writes, 'not since the era of the First Five Year Plan (1929-32) had architects, planners and their politician patrons shown such enthusiasm for the idea that the way to make cities socialist was to build them from the ground up.' 34 Despite the architectural impulse and initial political will to exploit the opportunities created by wartime destruction to create 'socialist cities', rebuilding destroyed cities and fractured urban communities proved a protracted process. The rapid construction of new industrial cities in the 1930s, such as Magnitogorsk, gave Soviet decision makers, architects, planners and workers experience of construction at breakneck speed, but rapid post-war reconstruction proved exceptionally difficult. 35 In mid-June 1945 it was calculated that the city would need to build 820,000 square metres of permanent housing by the end of 1947 to house its expanding population, and a further 100,000 square metres of barracks for construction workers. 36 urban centres should take hampered reconstruction. 'In various other cities, planners completed centre-ensemble blueprints in relatively short order, but these ended up being ignored, either because they were too general to be of use, or because local officials lacked the tools to implement them. ' 39 In an economy dominated by extreme shortages of finance, skilled labour and building materials, grand architectural visions usually remained on paper. 40 In practice, reconstruction was often a pragmatic response to an emergency situation in which architects' urban visions were subordinated to the necessity of ensuring the basic functioning of cities. The cities that took shape in the wake of war often seemed 'unplanned' cities. In this they had much in common with Magnitogorsk or Nowa Huta. Uncoordinated reconstruction began before general plans were completed or approved, with many more radical aspects of planners' urban visions abandoned in the face of competing demands. 41 'Soviet town planning', as Stephen Kotkin writes, often 'turned out to resemble after-the-fact reconstruction had been achieved'. 43 Although average per capita incomes approached pre-war levels as early as 1948, the notion of a dynamic economic recovery is somewhat misleading. Rapid economic recovery, as Mark Harrison has argued, was in part explained by the extent of the accumulated economic backlog and by missed economic opportunities, created by previous disasters.
As the post-war Soviet economy made up lost ground, an impression of rapid growth and economic resilience was created. 44 launched an attack on local leaders. Amongst the most contentious issues was the extreme shortage of building materials. Local production of building materials was still operating at 1944 levels, and needed to be doubled for construction plans to be met. Brick factories had fulfilled just 16 per cent of the plan. Pronin was especially angry that not a single brick factory had a functioning water supply, despite the Volga's proximity. He predicted a scandal about building materials, especially as prefabricated buildings would not be provided to the city after June 1946. Pronin highlighted an additional reason for the slow pace of reconstruction, namely the city's finance department's failure to control its expenditure. As he phrased it, 'we have become used to not considering anything with less than five zeros on the end as (serious) money, but before we shot criminals over 8,000 to 10,000 (roubles).' Pronin's threats were intended to remind Stalingraders that allowances would no longer be made for the city, despite its symbolic importance and Stalin's personal interest in it. Stalingrad's reconstruction in Pronin's words was still 'rickety' (khlipko); the city simply had to do better. The city's leaders were reminded that they had to live up to the wartime achievements of the Red Army.
The unity of front and rear and the bond between the military and civilians, at least in this instance, appeared to be fragile, with martial achievements used to exhort civilians to work harder towards reconstruction. New planning and building methods, mechanisation and qualified workers were necessary to make a decisive breakthrough, not 100-year-old traditions. Yet, even with the arrival of 12,000 repatriated workers and between 10,000 and 15,000 demobilised soldiers, Pronin predicted that reconstruction would take decades, rather than the year or two indicated in the press. 54
In the face of shortages of manual and skilled labour the city authorities attempted to harness the 'voluntary' labour of ordinary citizens. According to a booklet circulated to repatriated Soviet citizens in 1945, there was enormous popular enthusiasm for rebuilding war-ravaged cities.
Stalingrad's citizens had been mobilised since 1943, often through mass volunteering campaigns, to assist in reconstruction. Their numbers were swelled by fifteen thousand Komsomol members from across the Soviet Union. 55 In 1946 John Strohm, for example, met a nineteen-year-old woman living in a dugout in the centre of Stalingrad, who told him 'about the wonderful plans for rebuilding the city, how she gave a day of her time each week to help carry away the blasted bricks and other debris . . . .' 56 Efforts to mobilise citizens for reconstruction work were often embraced with enthusiasm, as an opportunity to assist in the collective reconstruction effort, fulfil one's civic duty and improve one's living conditions. The mobilisation of voluntary labour for the purposes of reconstruction was, of course, not unique to Soviet society, but late Stalinist society continued to make use of voluntary labour for longer than other countries, with a greater burden falling on individual citizens rather than professional construction workers. In the first ten months of 1948 alone 86,705 people volunteered 2,674,800 hours in voluntary labour. They cleared hundreds of thousand cubic metres of rubble, repaired water supply and roads and planted more than 300,000 trees and bushes. 57 solutions and better quality housing gradually began to take shape. 62 By the end of 1950 three-and-ahalf billion roubles had been spent on reconstruction, including 700 million roubles on housing construction and communal facilities. Ninety thousand square metres of housing were built in 1949 and 123,000 square metres in 1950, often in three to five storey buildings with good communal services including water, mains drainage, electricity and central heating. 63 Yet, much about the urban environment still fell short of expectations. In 1950 a team of investigators from the Ministry of Urban Construction reported that, although reconstruction work had gathered pace, central streets and squares were still disorderly. Their report stated that, 'in the main, they (streets and squares) are wastelands covered with the uncleared ruins of destroyed buildings, and neither they nor various parts have anything resembling the appearance of having been completed'. 64 As late as 1951 there were still over 1,300 families living in dugouts, and other buildings unsuitable for habitation, many of whom faced long walks to work through the wasteland. It was hoped that all of these people could be housed properly in the course of 1952, but it is doubtful this was achieved. 65 The experienced more rapid recoveries. When in April 1947 an American journalist visiting the city asked his guides whether building homes was the first priority for Stalingrad, he was told that industrial enterprises, cultural, educational and healthcare institutions, such as schools, nurseries, hospitals and clubs, were considered higher priorities. 66 Pigalev told the assembled foreign correspondents that over 50 per cent of damaged factories had been rebuilt. In contrast the 50 per cent mark in housing reconstruction was only reached in June 1948. 67 Whilst much of the Stalingrad tractor factory lay in ruins it was already churning out tractors; 6,000 tractors in 1946 alone. 68 By the time the group of foreign correspondents visited in April 1947 approximately 65 per cent of the factory had been rebuilt, and production was running at 70 per cent of the pre-war level. 69 By 1950
Stalingrad's industry had been completely restored, and production was running at over 30 per cent of pre-war levels. 70 This was achieved by privileging the industrial economy ahead of urban living standards. How Stalingrad's residents reacted to this state of affairs is unclear. After a war in which many soldiers and civilians hoped for a less coercive and more responsive form of Stalinism combined with improved living standards, the protracted period of reconstruction was highly frustrating. Wartime suffering and sacrifice and prolonged post-war hardship did not necessarily create 'equality through poverty' or social unity. Allocating funding, determining reconstruction priorities and deciding who was to be re-housed in new buildings were all potentially divisive.
One of the most divisive aspects of rebuilding urban life in severely damaged cities was reestablishing pre-war housing settlement patterns. In cities like Stalingrad, where little remained, this was virtually impossible. Even in less damaged cities the destruction of housing and the movement of people within and between cities meant that many people found themselves living in different buildings and apartments. Demobilised veterans, returning evacuees and repatriates often returned to find their homes occupied by others. In the most severely damaged cities, residential buildings had begun to be used for entirely different purposes. In Stalingrad in May 1946 former homes were still being used to accommodate district Soviets, a bank, the city's main library, a nursery for war orphans, a gynaecological ward and offices for the police and prosecutors. In these instances individuals had to challenge the city authorities, and the full bureaucratic force of the state, something that weakened their chances of reclaim their housing. Stalingrad's prosecutor suggested that it might make sense for the city to be exempted from the legislation that allowed demobilised soldiers to regain their housing because of the level of disruption it would cause the city's administration. 71 Attempting to reclaim housing through legal channels was often a complicated and lengthy process that set citizens against each other, municipal governments and even against the adjudicating authorities. 72 Inevitably many people with good claims, failed in their attempts to reclaim their former homes, something which created deep resentments. Assessments of wartime service sometimes coloured decisions about housing entitlements. Re-evacuees, prisoners of war, repatriates and even the war-disabled often struggled to gain access to urban areas, and to assert their claims to pre-war living space. Jewish evacuees, in particular, experienced stigmatisation, hostility and discrimination, supposedly for having sat the war out in safety behind the lines. The rise in anti-Semitism during and after the war was, in part, fed by a perception that wartime sacrifice had not 71 GARF, f.R-8131, op.37. d.2445, ll.72-3. 72 Manley, '"Where should we settle the comrades next?", 233-46. been universal. 73 Ethnic identity increasingly came to be seen as an indicator of loyalty to the state.
War experiences, far from uniting society, had the capacity to divide communities.
Although the wholesale destruction and severe depopulation experienced by cities in western
Russia was not a universal experience, Soviet citizens did not have to live in the warzone to Kuibyshev, another evacuation centre which experienced rapid wartime industrialisation had, in contrast to Magnitogorsk and Syrzan', built extensively during the war. The arrival of 235,000 evacuated workers and tens of thousands of rural migrants, although partially offset by the mobilisation of men and women into the Red Army, rapidly increased the city's population. 83 By 1945 Kuibyshev's population had risen by 103,000 or 24 per cent, from 427,000 in 1940 to 530,000.
Kuibyshev, however, was unusual in that during the war its housing stock had increased by 45 per cent, from 1,495,000 to 2,179,000 square metres, a rate of increase that exceeded population growth.
Average living space per person increased from 3.5 square metres to 4.1 square metres. 84 As evacuation progressed whole new city districts sprang up around evacuated plants, although these were not without their problems. In the Kirovskii district, a new suburb which developed around evacuated aviation factories, more than 200,000 square metres of housing was built. While this was to be welcomed approximately 90 per cent of new accommodation took the form of temporary frame buildings and timber barracks. 85 Furthermore, while new buildings were being built in one part of the city in other districts pre-war housing was falling into disrepair. In mid-June 1946 the challenge of improving housing maintenance was the central question discussed at a meeting of the Kuibyshev city Soviet. In lengthy speech P. V. Surin, the city Soviet chairmen, stressed the importance of caring for housing. Surin was brutally honest about the failures of local housing administrations to take repairs seriously: 'Unfortunately, it is necessary to openly say that we relate to housing barbarically, we don't look after buildings, we don't as a rule repair them on time, we still don't have a careful 83 86 Although Surin, and presumably others, appreciated the importance of improving living conditions across the city, appeals for urban repairs often fell on deaf ears. Other sources confirm that in 1944 and 1945 just half of planned building maintenance was undertaken. 87 At the end of 1945 approximately 200 buildings controlled by district Soviets, with a living space of 19,000 square metres, were in a critical condition and fifty dangerous buildings, with a living space of 5,000 square metres, required demolition. 88 Although Kuibyshev fared better than many cities of its type, and far better than cities on the frontline, it nevertheless faced serious difficulties in building and maintaining housing for its growing population. Even relatively privileged cities found it difficult to realise the official vision of an orderly socialist realist city in concrete form. build their own homes, and provided a stimulus to post-war reconstruction. Individuals could borrow up to 10,000 roubles to be paid back over a ten-year period to build homes, a process often administered via employers. The scheme was extremely popular, despite mixed results and problems in some locations, and led to a significant increase in the amount of housing held as personal property, as opposed that controlled by local Soviets or employers. 105 Gorfat, however, saw individual citizens building their own homes as a 'dangerous' development, and a 'stumbling block' (kamen' pretknoveniia). He objected to the design of new structures, the architectural details employed and perhaps feared the erosion of his professional role. More significant, however, were wider systematic failings. When an industrial enterprise was allocated funds to enable individual construction they only received money to build that structure. The bill for providing roads and connections to water, electricity and mains drainage had to be met by the city. 106 In Gorfat's opinion this was not a rational use of money and created difficulties for planning a consistent urban environment across an entire city. Individual construction within or on the outskirts of cities created pockets of buildings which disrupted urban planning. He also stressed that decisions about where to locate individual housing could provoke disagreements. He described a dispute he had with officials from the Kirov factory over a parcel of land, earmarked for parkland in the city's general plan, on which they intended to build privately owned housing. When the request to build here was refused, the Kirov factory went over the head of the city's architect by appealing to the Cheliabinsk Party There were then at least two main experiences of urban reconstruction after 1945that of ruined cities in the war zone, on the one hand, and that of industrial cities in the East which grew rapidly during and after the war, but without the investment required to create comfortable or stable urban life, on the other. There was great variation in both the progress of reconstruction amongst war-ravaged cities and the fate of rapidly expanding industrial cities. However, the difference between rebuilding destroyed cities and dealing with the effects of rapid urbanisation at a time of chronic under-investment created one of the most important divisions between post-war Soviet cities.
Although wartime propaganda stressed the solidarity between the front and rear, and post-war rhetoric celebrated the unity of society despite the pressures created by reconstruction, the distinction between these two types of post-war experience were not lost on ordinary citizens. In 1965 N. S. Nasokin, a party member from Gorkii, wrote to Leonid Brezhnev expressing his disappointment about his city's post-war development. Although Gorkii didn't have 'dirt thrown in its face' during the war the letter was keen to stress the city's and its people's contribution to the war effort.
Employing the rhetoric of wartime equality of sacrifice Nasokin questioned why his city was still in poor condition, while others had resolved their problems. 'Having participated in the Great Patriotic War, I thrashed my way around Mother Russia and saw many cities and towns. After the war I have been, thanks to my work and holidays, to many cities which experienced the war, and I am becoming ashamed for my native city'. Even the destroyed and wounded cities he had seen now had asphalted roads, well-ordered parks, good public transport and their people lived well. Nasokin noted that, average per capita living space in Gorkii was 5.1 square metres, 460,000 square metres of living space was in dilapidated housing, 180,000 square metres of which were in dangerous buildings, and 67,000 people were living in barracks and basements. 110 These statistics were intended to demonstrate that post-war reconstruction brought few benefits to Gorkii's residents. Inevitably postwar reconstruction had produced winners and losers, rather than social unity. While millions of roubles were pumped into ensuring the recovery of destroyed cities, urbanities which had repeatedly been told that their contribution to the war effort was as crucial as cities on the frontline felt that they were losing out and falling behind. Rapid population growth and industrialisation were never going to be easy to manage, but in an era of austerity the effects were especially divisive.
While the nature and pace of reconstruction varied between cities, individuals also experienced reconstruction in different ways. The war's urban impact and the challenges of post-war recovery were not only very different in cities in the warzone and in the rear, but reconstruction also created divisions within cities themselves. Local elites, decision makers, architects, planners and individual citizens frequently conceived the priorities for post-war reconstruction differently. They faced different challenges and wanted different outcomes from reconstruction. While individuals sought a resolution to their housing problems, factory managers had to think about balancing workers' needs with the necessity of meeting output targets. Meanwhile, Party and Soviet leaders had to balance their budgets and allocate scare material resources for the collective good. Architects and planners attempted to create well-ordered urban environments that looked beyond short-term pressures of providing temporary living space, and thought about creating fully functioning cities which were aesthetically pleasing and pleasant to live in. As in any society urban planning issues were capable of provoking disagreements, divisions and conflicts. The post-war economy of shortages, far from creating unity, reinforced social differences and divisions.
The uniqueness of Soviet reconstruction, however, did not lay in the diversity of post-war urban experience, but the manner in which the war's urban impact was confronted. Given the extent of destruction, there was much about the national reconstruction effort that was impressive. In the face of extreme shortages of labour, building materials and capital the achievements of the partystate and ordinary people were remarkable. The rebuilding of urban space, however, was less successful than planners had envisaged, and far slower than post-war propaganda suggested. While some citizens saw their living conditions improve relatively quickly, the rather fragile progress of reconstruction meant that others had to wait years before they began to experience the tangible benefits. Architects and planners were often thwarted in their attempts to create cohesive urban spaces worthy of modern socialist cities. Much of their visions remained on paper or in maquettes rather than bricks and mortar. Preventing a collapse of urban life and solving immediate crises frequently prevented a more systematic urban reconstruction from taking shape. In the cities explored here, a thorough reorientation of the Soviet urban project came not with the end of the war, but the launch of Khrushchev's mass housing program of the mid-1950s. This is not to say that important preconditions for subsequent change did not take shape under late Stalinist. Important developments in prefabrication and individual ownership, as Mark B. Smith has demonstrated, were made in these years. 111 Yet, while much of Europe embraced reconstruction as an opportunity to build new forms of urbanity, the rebuilt cities that took shape across Soviet Russia often resembled, in Stephen Kotkin's words, 'the temporary city of the present' familiar from the 1930s, rather than the socialist city of the future. 112 It was not that these visions, and the impulse to 'build socialism' did not exist, but the extreme pressures created by wartime destruction and underinvestment took longer to surmount than anticipated. Until a more stable society began to emerge from the aftermath of war it was impossible to construct a new urban form for socialism.
